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ROBUST COMMUNICATION ON NETWORKS
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ABSTRACT. We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two
distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the
receiver is thus indirect. We ask when it is possible to robustly implement the equilibrium
outcomes of the direct communication game as equilibrium outcomes of indirect commu-
nication games on the network. Robust implementation requires that: (i) the implemen-
tation is independent of the preferences of the intermediaries and (ii) the implementation
is guaranteed at all histories consistent with unilateral deviations by the intermediaries.
Robust implementation of direct communication is possible if and only if either the sender
and receiver are directly connected or there exist two disjoint paths between the sender
and the receiver.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In large organizations, such as public administrations, governments, armed forces and
multinational corporations, information typically flows through the different layers of
the organization, from engineers, sale representatives, accountants to top managers and
executives. Communication is indirect. While indirect communication is necessary in
large organizations – the CEO of IBM cannot directly communicate with each of its 352,
600 employees – it may harm the effective transmission of valuable information. Indeed,
as the objectives of members of an organization are rarely perfectly aligned, distorting,
delaying or even suppressing the transmission of information are natural ways, among
others, for members of the organization to achieve their own objectives.1 Does it exist
organizational arrangements, which mitigate these issues? The main insight of this
paper is that there is: matrix organization.2
Matrix organization (or management) consists in organizing activities along more than
one dimension, e.g., function (marketing, accounting, engineering, R&D, etc), geography
(US, Europe, Asia, etc) or products. From the early 60’s to the present, large corpora-
tions such as NASA, IBM, Pearson, Siemens and Starbucks have adopted this mode of
management. A central feature of matrix organization ismultiple reporting, that is, low-
level employees report to multiple independent managers. E.g., an engineer working on
a project to be implemented in Europe will report to the manager of the engineering
division, to the manager of the project and to the manager of the European division. In
other words, the information can flow via independent channels. As we shall see, this
is the main reason why matrix organization facilitates the effective communication of
valuable information. (See Baron and Besanko, 1996, and Harriv and Raviv, 2002, for
economic models of matrix organization and Galbraith, 2009, and Schro¨tter, 2014, for
qualitative analysis.)
To study the issue of communication in organizations, we consider sender-receiver games
on communication networks, where the communication network models the reporting
lines within the organization.3 The main theoretical question this paper addresses
1Companies like Seismic, an enterprise level software technology provider, specialize in helping
teams within organizations to work better together. See https://hbr.org/2017/02/how-aligned-is-your-
organization, “How Aligned is Your Organization?” Harvard Business Review, Jonathan Trevor and Barry
Varcoe, February 2017.
2We do not claim that matrix organization was designed with this goal in mind; it is rather a consequence,
perhaps even unintended, of its design.
3We voluntarily abstract from a host of other organizational issues, such as team management, remuner-
ation, ownership, or internal capital market.
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is whether it is possible to robustly implement the equilibrium outcomes of the direct
communication game as equilibrium outcomes of indirect communication games on the
network. Robust implementation imposes two requirements: (i) the implementation
is independent of the preferences of the intermediaries, and (ii) the implementation is
guaranteed at all histories consistent with (at most) one intermediary deviating at any
stage of the communication game. (Different intermediaries can deviate at different
stages.) The first requirement guarantees that the communication is robust to the po-
tential mis-alignment of preferences within the organization. The second requirement
guarantees that the organization can tolerate some mistakes, errors or even deliberate
disruptions in communication. In sum, our two requirements insures effective commu-
nication within the organization.
We prove that the robust implementation of direct communication is possible if, and
only if, either the sender and receiver are directly connected, or there are (at least) two
disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver. The condition
is clearly necessary. Indeed, if it is not satisfied, then all communication between the
sender and the receiver must transit through a fixed intermediary (a cut of the graph).
This intermediary controls all the flow of information and, therefore, can disrupt the im-
plementation of all equilibrium outcomes of the direct communication game, which are
unfavorable to him. If the sender and the receiver are directly connected, the condition
is also clearly sufficient. So, assume that they are not directly connected. To illustrate
the difficulties we face, consider the network in Figure 1.
R
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of the difficulties
There are three disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver, so it is tempting to use a
majority argument. That is: to have the sender transmit his message to intermediaries
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1, 2 and 3, and to have all intermediaries forward their messages. If the intermediaries
are obedient, then the receiver obtains three identical copies of the message sent and
indeed learns it. Suppose now that the sender wishes to transmit the message m. If
intermediary 1 reports m′ 6= m at the first stage and intermediary 5 reports m′′ 6= m at
the second stage, the receiver then faces the profile of reports (m′, m′′, m). Thus, we need
the receiver to decode it as m. However, the receiver would receive the same profile of
reports (m′, m′′, m) when the sender wishes to transmit the message m′, intermediary 3
reports m and intermediary 5 reports m′′. Since the receiver would decode it as m, he
would learn the wrong message. Such a simple strategy does not work in general.4 The
main difficulty we have to deal with is that different intermediaries deviate at different
stages.
The communication protocol we construct requires several rounds of communication and
rich communication possibilities. Players must be able to broadcast messages to any
subset of their neighbors. Broadcasting a message to a group insures common knowl-
edge of the message among the group’s members. It is a very natural assumption: face-
to-face meetings, online meetings via platforms like Zoom orMicrosoft Teams, Whatsapp
groups, all makes it possible to broadcast to a group. To sum up, in large organizations,
where it is difficult to align the preferences of all, dual lines of reporting facilitate the
flow of information throughout the organization and limit the ability of managers to
distort reports to their own advantages. However, this comes at a cost: frequent meet-
ings and emailing. For instance, our protocols requires 28 rounds of communication in
the illustrative example and more than a hundred meetings! The tendency of matrix
organization to generate countless meetings was already noticed in the late 70’s.
Top managers were spending more time than ever before in meetings or in
airplanes taking them to and from meetings. (McKinsey Quarterly Review,
“Beyond matrix organization.” September 1979.5)
We derive another important result. Besides replicating the equilibrium outcomes of
the direct communication game, the communication games we construct may have ad-
ditional equilibrium outcomes. By construction, these equilibrium outcomes are equilib-
rium outcomes of the mediated communication game between the sender and receiver,
4This simple strategy works if there are enough disjoint paths. In that example, we need two additional
disjoint paths.
5https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/beyond-the-matrix-
organization#
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that is, when the communication between the sender and the receiver is intermediated
by a mediator. We show that if there are two disjoint paths between the sender and the
receiver in the network obtained by deleting the link, if any, between the sender and
the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes of the mediated communi-
cation game between the sender and the receiver. Precluding direct communication may
therefore help decision makers in achieving better outcomes.
Related literature. This paper is related to several strands of literature. The com-
monality between these strands of literature is the construction of protocols to securely
transmit a message from a sender to a receiver on a communication network. The secure
transmission of a message requires that (i) the receiver correctly learns the sender’s
message, and (ii) intermediaries do not obtain additional information about the mes-
sage, while executing the protocol. Reliability (or resiliency) refers to the first require-
ment, while secrecy refers to the second.
To start with, there is a large literature in computer science, which studies the problem
of secure transmission of messages on communication networks. See, among others,
Beimel and Franklin (1999), Dolev et al. (1993), Franklin and Wright (2004), Renault
and Tomala (2008), and Renault and al. (2014). This literature provides conditions on
the topology of the communication networks for the secure transmission of a message
from a sender to a receiver. See Renault and al. (2014) for a summary of these results.
An important assumption of all this literature is that the adversary controls a fixed
set of nodes throughout the execution of the communication protocols. The adversary
we consider is stronger in that it can control different sets of nodes at each round of
communication. To the best of our knowledge, such an adversary has not been studied
in the computer science literature. However, we restrict attention to singletons, while
the computer science literature considers larger sets.
This paper is also related to the literature on repeated games on networks, where the
network models the monitoring structure and/or the communication possibilities. See,
among others, Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Laclau (2012, 2014), Renault and
Tomala (1998), Tomala (2011) and Wolitzky (2015). This literature characterizes the
networks for which folk theorems obtain. An essential step in obtaining a folk theo-
rem is the construction of protocols, which guarantee that upon observing a deviation,
players start a punishment phase. To do so, when a player observes a deviation, he
must be able to securely transmit the message “my neighbor has deviated” to all other
players. None of these papers have studied the issue of robustly communicating the
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identity of the deviator on communication networks. Either the communication is re-
stricted to a network, in which case it is not robust (Laclau, 2012; Renault and Tomala,
1998; Tomala, 2011; Wolitzky, 2015), or the communication is unrestricted, direct and
immediate (Ben-Porath and Kahneman, 1996; Laclau, 2014).6
This paper is also related to the literature on mediated and unmediated communication
in games. See, among others, Barany (1985), Ben Porath (1998), Forges (1986, 1990),
Forges and Vida (2013), Gerardi (2004), Myerson (1986), Renault and Tomala (2004), Re-
nou and Tomala (2012) and Rivera (2017). In common with this literature, e.g., Barany
(1985), Forges (1990), Forges and Vida (2013), or Gerardi (2004), we show that we can
emulate mediated communication with unmediated communication. The novelty is that
we do it on communication networks, albeit for a particular class of games, i.e., sender-
receiver games.
Finally, this paper is related to the large literature on cheap talk games, pioneered by
Crawford and Sobel (1984) and Aumann and Hart (2003,1993) See Forges (2020) for a
recent survey. The closest paper to ours is Ambrus et al. (2014). These authors consider
simple communication networks (perfectly hierarchical networks) and restrict attention
to a particular class of games. Their emphasis is complementary to ours. We ask when
it is possible to robustly implement all equilibrium outcomes of the direct (unmediated
and mediated) communication game on a communication network, while they ask what
are the equilibrium outcomes of their fixed game.
2. ROBUST COMMUNICATION
2.1. The problem. We start with some mathematical preliminaries. Unless indicated
otherwise, all sets X are complete separable metric spaces, endowed with their Borel
σ-algebra BX . We write ∆(X) for the set of regular probability measures on X. Let X
and Y be two complete separable metric spaces. Throughout, we abuse notation and
write f : Y → ∆(X) for the function f : Y × BX → [0, 1] such that (i) for all y ∈ Y , the
function f(y, ·) : BX → [0, 1] is a probability measure, and (ii) for all B ∈ BX , the function
f(·, B) : Y → [0, 1] is measurable.
There are a sender and a receiver, labelled S and R, respectively. The sender knows a
payoff-relevant state ω ∈ Ω, with ν ∈ ∆(Ω) the prior probability. The receiver takes an
6In the latter case, the network models the structure of observation and/or interaction, but not the com-
munication possibilities.
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action a ∈ A. For all i ∈ {S,R}, player i’s payoff function is ui : A × Ω → R, which we
assume to be measurable.
Direct communication. Consider the direct communication game, where the sender
can directly communicate with the receiver, that is, the sender can send a message
m ∈ M to the receiver, prior to the receiver choosing an action a ∈ A. In the direct
communication game, a strategy for the sender is a map σ : Ω→ ∆(M), while a strategy
for the receiver is a map τ : M → ∆(A). We denote Ed ⊆ ∆(Ω × A) the set of (Nash)
equilibrium distributions over states and actions of the direct communication game.
Note that we may have Ed = ∅.
Indirect communication. To model indirect communication, we assume that the
sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes on an (undirected) network N . The set
of nodes, other than S and R, is denoted I, which we interpret as a set of n interme-
diaries. Communication between the sender and the receiver transits through these
intermediaries. We let Ni be the set of neighbors of i ∈ I∗ := I ∪ {S,R} in the network.
Communication game on a network. A communication game on the network N
is a multi-stage game with T < ∞ stages, where at each stage players send costless
messages to their neighbors and the receiver decides either to take an action (and stop
the game) or to continue communicating.
We first define communication mechanisms, denotedM, as the sets of messages players
can send to each others. We allow for a rich set of communication possibilities. Com-
munication can be private, e.g., private emails or one-to-one meetings, or public, e.g.,
emails sent to distribution lists or group meetings, or a mixed of both. We say that
player i broadcasts a message to a (non-empty) subset of his neighbors N ⊆ Ni if (i) all
players in N receive the same message, and (ii) it is a common belief among all players
in N that they have received the same message (in other words, the list of recipients of
the message is certifiable among them). Face-to-face group meetings, online meetings
via platforms like Zoom or Microsoft Teams, Whatsapp groups, all makes it possible to
broadcast to a group.
Communication unfolds as follows: at each stage t, players broadcast messages to all
possible (non-empty) subsets of neighbors. The set of messages player i can broadcast
to the subset of neighbors N ∈ 2Ni \ {∅} is MiN . Let Mi =
∏
N∈2Ni\{∅}MiN be the
set of messages available to player i, and M =
∏
i∈I∗Mi the set of messages available
to all players. Few remarks are worth making. First, private messages correspond
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to broadcasting to singletons. Second, the sets of messages available to a player are
independent of both time and past histories of messages sent and received. The latter
is with loss of generality. However, without such an assumption, the model has no bite.
Indeed, if the only message player i can transmit upon receiving the message m is the
message m itself, an extreme form of history dependence, then we trivially reproduce
direct communication with indirect communication.
Finally, we need two additional elements to obtain the communication game from the
communication mechanism. First, we assume that at each stage, the receiver can either
take an action a ∈ A or continue communicating, in which case he sends a message
mR ∈ MR. If the receiver takes the action a, the game stops. Second, we need to as-
sociate payoffs with terminal histories. The payoff to player i ∈ I∗ is ui(a, ω) when the
state is ω and the receiver takes action a, with ui : A×Ω→ R a measurable function. (If
the receiver never takes an action, the payoff to all players is −∞.) Thus, communica-
tion is purely cheap talk. We denote Γ(M,N ) the communication game induced by the
mechanism M on the network N .
Strategies and equilibrium. A history of messages received and sent by player i up to
(but not including) period t is denoted hti, with H
t
i the set of all such histories. A (pure)
strategy for player i ∈ I is a collection of maps σi = (σi,t)t≥1, where at each stage t, σi,t
maps H ti to Mi. A (pure) strategy for the sender is a collection of maps σS = (σS,t)t≥1,
where at each stage t, σS,t maps Ω × H tS to MS. A (pure) strategy for the receiver is
a collection of maps σR = (σR,t)t≥1, where at each stage t, σR,t maps H
t
R to MR ∪ A.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation for behavioral strategies. Let
H t = ×i∈I∗H ti . We write Pσ(·|h
t) for the distribution over terminal histories and states
induced by the strategy profile σ = (σS, σR, (σi)i∈I), given the history h
t ∈ H t, and Pσ for
the distribution, conditional on the initial (empty) history.
We now define what we mean by “consistent with unilateral deviations.” Fix a strategy
profile σ. We define Σ(σ) as the set of strategy profiles such that σ′ ∈ Σ(σ) if, and only
if, there exists a sequence of intermediaries (i1, . . . , it, . . . ) such that σ
′
t = (σ
′
it,t
, σ−it,t) for
all t. Thus, Σ(σ) consists all strategy profiles consistent with at most one intermediary
deviating at each stage. Note that (σ′i, σ−i) ∈ Σ(σ) for all σ
′
i, for all i ∈ I. We let H(σ)
be the set of terminal histories consistent with Σ(σ), that is, h ∈ H(σ) if there exists
σ′ ∈ Σ(σ) such that h is in the support of Pσ′ . Similarly, we let Σ∗(σ) be the set of
strategy profiles consistent with at most one player i ∈ I∗ deviating from σ at each
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stage, thus Σ∗(σ) also includes deviations by the sender and the receiver. Note that
σ ∈ Σ(σ) ⊂ Σ∗(σ).
We are now ready to define the concept of robust communication on a network. We first
start with an informal description. We say that the robust implementation of direct
communication is possible on a network if, regardless of the preferences of the interme-
diaries, we can construct a communication game on the network with the property that
for any distribution over actions and states of the direct communication game, there ex-
ists an equilibrium of the communication game which replicates that distribution, not
only on the equilibrium path, but also at all paths consistent with at most one interme-
diary deviating at each stage. In other words, the implementation is not only robust to
the preferences of the intermediaries, but also to unilateral deviations.
Definition 1 (Robust implementation of direct communication on the network N ). Ro-
bust implementation of direct communication is possible on the network N if there exists
a communication mechanism M on N such that for all utility profiles of the intermedi-
aries (ui)i∈I , for all distributions µ ∈ Ed of all direct communication games, there exists a
Nash equilibrium σ of Γ(M,N ) satisfying:
∀σ′ ∈ Σ(σ), margA×ΩPσ′ = µ.
2.2. Discussion. In modern organizations, most employees, from top-executives to low-
level managers, devote a significant fraction of their time to internal communication:
they draft and circulate memos, attend and call meetings, write e-mail, etc. The net-
work N captures these communication possibilities, particularly who can call a meeting
with whom. If there is a link between players i and j and between players i and k,
player i can communicate with players j and k both privately (face-to-face meetings)
and publicly (group meetings). In organizations, meetings serve several functions, from
communicating information to making decisions through generating ideas. The former,
i.e., meetings as information forum, is the closest to the role meetings play in our anal-
ysis. When player i broadcasts a message to players j and k, player i informs players j
and k.
We stress that if the robust implementation of direct communication is possible on the
networkN , then the implementation is not only robust to the preferences of the interme-
diaries, but also to the underlying communication game. In other words, the very same
network of communication N allows for the robust implementation of any equilibrium
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outcome of any direct communication game. This property is important. It implies that,
within an organization, the reporting lines do not need to change with the challenges
the organization faces.
Also, the implementation is robust to at most one intermediary deviating at every stage
of the indirect communication game. While we cannot hope for the implementation to
be robust to any number of deviations at every stage, this is still stronger than imposing
that the same intermediary deviates at every stage, as equilibrium analysis would do.
Finally, the solution concept is Nash equilibrium. As we explain later, it is possible to
define belief systems to guarantee the sequential rationality of the equilibria we con-
struct. We do not explicitly consider refinements of the concept of Nash equilibrium as
most refinements do not apply to games with continuous action spaces and, most impor-
tantly, this would add nothing to our analysis. None of our analysis requires irrational
behaviors off the equilibrium path to sustain the equilibrium. Instead, our analysis
relies on indifferences. Robust implementation necessitates that players are made in-
different between deviating or not. (If not, an adversarial intermediary would always
benefit from deviating.)
3. ROBUST COMMUNICATION
This section states our results and provide some intuition. All proofs are relegated to
the Appendix. We start with our main contribution.
3.1. The main result.
Theorem 1. Robust implementation of direct communication is possible on the network
N if, and only if, either the sender and receiver are neighbors, or N admits two disjoints
paths between the sender and the receiver.
To understand Theorem 1, note that if the sender and the receiver are neighbors, the
robust implementation of direct communication is clearly possible. The sender and re-
ceiver can communicate directly and ignore all messages from intermediaries. So, as-
sume that they are not neighbors. The theorem states that there must exist two disjoint
paths between them. This is clearly necessary. Indeed, if no such paths exist, there ex-
ists an intermediary, who controls all the information transiting between the sender and
the receiver. In graph-theoretic terms, the intermediary is a cut of the graph. In games
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where the sender and the receiver have perfectly aligned preferences, but the intermedi-
aries have opposite preferences, the “cut” can then simulate the histories of messages he
would have received in a particular state and behave accordingly. The receiver cannot
distinguish between the simulated and real histories and, thus, the “cut” can induce the
receiver to take a sub-optimal action. In fact, the problem is even more severe. Since
robust implementation requires the equilibrium distribution µ to be implemented at all
histories consistent with unilateral deviations by the “cut,” the distribution µ must be
independent of the state ω to guarantee robust implementation. Thus, even in games
with perfectly aligned preferences, robust implementation does not hold if there is a
“cut.”
To prove sufficiency, we consider the following sub-problem. Suppose that the sender
sends the message m to the receiver. We want to find a protocol (a communication
mechanism and a strategy profile) such that the receiver correctly learns the message
m not only at all on-path histories, but also at all histories consistent with at most one
player, including the sender and the receiver, deviating at each stage of the protocol.
Theorem 2 states that such a protocol exists when they are two disjoint paths between
the sender and the receiver. The receiver learns the message after at most 1 + (nC −
3)(2nC − 3) stages, where nC is the number nodes on the two shortest disjoint paths
from the sender to the receiver. The proof of Theorem 1 then follows. Let (σ∗, τ ∗) be
an equilibrium of the direct communication game, with distribution µ. Let the sender
draws the message m with probability σ∗(m|ω) when the state is ω. We can then invoke
Theorem 2 to prove that the receiver correctly learns the message m in finite time at
all histories consistent with unilateral deviations. Upon learning m, we let the receiver
choose a with probability τ ∗(a|m). It is immediate to prove that we have an equilibrium,
which guarantees the robust implementation of direct communication.
The solution concept is Nash equilibrium. It is straightforward, albeit tedious and cum-
bersome, to define belief systems to guarantee the sequential rationality of the equilibria
we construct. To see this, let σ be a Nash equilibrium of the communication game we
construct. Consider any history hti consistent with unilateral deviations, i.e., there ex-
ists σ′ ∈ Σ(σ) such that hti is in the support of Pσ′ . If intermediary i’s belief at h
t
i is
the “conditioning” of Pσ′ on h
t
i, then robust implementation implies sequential rational-
ity. Indeed, with an abuse of notation, we have P(σ˜i,σ−i)(·|h
t)Pσ′(h
t) = µ for all σ˜i, for all
σ′ ∈ Σ(σ) and, therefore, intermediary i is indifferent between all his strategies at hti.
Since the argument does not rely on the specific σ′ ∈ Σ(σ) we select, we have sequential
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rationality with respect to any belief system, which is fully supported on the histories
consistent with unilateral deviations at hti. In other words, as long as the intermediary
believes that at most one player deviated at each of all past stages, we have sequen-
tial rationality at hti. Similarly, the equilibria we construct are also robust to deviations
by the sender and receiver at all stages but the first one, where the sender sends the
message, and the last one, where the receiver chooses an action. Therefore, we also
have sequential rationality at all histories htS and h
t
R. Finally, at all other histories, we
can construct beliefs and actions to guarantee sequential rationality. (See Section C for
details.) We now turn to a formal statement of Theorem 2.
3.2. Strong reliability. Consider the following problem: the sender wishes to transmit
the message m ∈ M , a realization of the random variable m with distribution ν, to the
receiver, through the network N . We want to construct a protocol, i.e., a communica-
tion mechanism and a profile of strategies, such that the receiver correctly “learns” the
message at all terminal histories consistent with unilateral deviations.
Definition 2. Transmission of messages is strongly reliable on the network N if there
exist a protocol and a decoding rule md : H
T+1
R → M such that
Pσ′
({
hT+1R : md(h
T+1
R ) = m
}
|m = m
)
= 1,
for all σ′ ∈ Σ∗(σ), for all m.
The study of the reliable transmission of messages on networks is not new, see Dolev
et al (1993), for an early attempt in Computer Science. (See Renault et al., 2014, for
a summary of the literature.) Computer scientists assume that an adversary controls
at most k nodes and provide conditions on the network for the reliable transmission of
messages. An important feature, however, is that the adversary controls the same k
nodes throughout the execution of the protocol. This is a natural assumption in Com-
puter Science, where communication is nearly instantaneous. An adversary would not
have the time or capacity to take control of different nodes during the execution of the
communication protocol.7 A distinctive feature of our analysis is to consider a dynamic
adversary, i.e., an adversary which controls a different set of nodes at each round of the
execution of the protocol. (However, we limit our attention to singletons, i.e., k = 1.) To
the best of our knowledge, this is new.
7Formally, the reliable transmission of messages requires that P(σ′
i
,σ−i)
(
{hT+1R : md(h
T+1
R ) = m}|m =
m
)
= 1 for all σ′i, for all i ∈ I. This is weaker requirement that strong reliability.
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Theorem 2. The transmission of messages is strongly reliable on the network N if and
only if either the sender and receiver are neighbors, or N admits two disjoints paths
between the sender and the receiver.
We illustrate our protocol with the help of the network in Figure 2. (The protocol we
construct is slightly more complicated, but they share the same properties.)
R
2
S
1
FIGURE 2. Illustration of Theorem 2
The protocol has six stages, which we now describe. To start with, the sender broadcasts
the messagem to intermediaries 1 and 2 at stage t = 1. At all other stages t = 2, . . . , 6, the
protocol requires the intermediaries to broadcast the message m and an authentication
key xti, where x
t
i is the authentication key of intermediary i at stage t, an uniform draw
from [0, 1], independent of all messages the intermediary has sent and received. Finally,
if the sender observes intermediary i broadcasting a message m′ 6= m at stage t, the
sender broadcasts the triplet (i, t, xti) at stage t + 1. We interpret the triplet (i, t, x
t
i) as
stating that intermediary i has deviated at stage t and his authentication key is xti.
If an intermediary receives the triplet (i, t, xti) at stage t + 1, the protocol requires the
intermediary to broadcast that triplet at all subsequent stages.
The receiver does not send messages. At the end of the six stages, the receiver decodes
the message as follows. If at any stage, the receiver has received the same message
from both intermediaries, then he assumes that this is the correct message. In all other
instances, if the receiver has received the samemessagemi from intermediary i at stages
t1, t2 and t3, and he has not received the triplet (i, t1, x
t1
i ) from the other intermediary by
stage t3, then he assumes that the correct message is mi.
8
8Equivalently, the receiver assumes that the correct message is mi when he has received mi from inter-
mediary i at stages t1, t2 and t3, and all triplets (i, t1, y
t1
i ) received from the intermediary −i by stage t3
are such that yt1i is different from x
t1
i , the authentication key received from i at stage t1.
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We now argue that the protocol guarantees the strong reliability of the transmission.
To start with, since at most one intermediary deviates at any stage, the protocol guar-
antees that the receiver obtains at least one sequence of three identical messages from
an intermediary. Moreover, if at any stage, the receiver obtains the same message from
both intermediaries, it must be the correct message (since at least one intermediary is
broadcasting the correct message). So, assume that the receiver obtains the message mi
from intermediary i at stages t1, t2 and t3 (t1 < t2 < t3). If mi 6= m (hence intermediary
i is deviating at stages t1, t2 and t3), the protocol requires the sender to broadcast the
triplet (i, t1, x
t1
i ) at stage t1 + 1 ≤ t2. The protocol also requires intermediary j 6= i to
broadcast the triplet (i, t1, x
t1
i ) at all stages after having received it. Hence, the receiver
obtains the triplet at stage t3 at the latest. Indeed, since intermediary i is deviating at
the stages (t1, t2, t3), intermediary j 6= i cannot be deviating at t2 and t3. Since the au-
thentication key received from intermediary j at either t2 or t3 matches the key received
from intermediary i at t1, the receiver learns that the message mi is not correct. The
correct message must therefore be the one broadcasted by intermediary j at stage t1,
that is, m. Alternatively, if mi = m, the sender does not broadcast the triplet (i, t1, x
t1
i ).
Intermediary j may pretend that the sender had sent the triplet (i, t1, y
t1
i ) at stage t1+1.
However, the probability that the reported authentication key yti matches the actual au-
thentication key xti is zero and, therefore, the receiver correctly infers that the message
is m.
We now preview some secondary aspects of the above construction. First, the protocol is
robust to deviations by the sender at all stages but the initial stage (where the sender
broadcasts m). Indeed, if the sender deviates at stage t ≥ 2, the two intermediaries
don’t, and the receiver then correctly learns the message. The protocol we construct
shares this property, which we will prove useful later on when intermediaries will also
have to reliably transmit messages. Second, the protocol starts with the two immediate
successors of the sender on the two disjoint paths to the receiver learning the message
m. At the end of the communication protocol, the receiver also learns the message.
In general, the receiver is not the immediate successor of these intermediaries; other
intermediaries are. The key step in our construction is to show that at least one of the
immediate successor of these intermediaries correctly learns the message at the end
of a first block of communication. Therefore, as the protocol goes through blocks, the
receiver eventually learns the message. Moreover, each block has 2nC − 3 stages, where
nC is the total number of nodes on the two disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver,
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including them. Thus, the receiver learns the message in at most 1 + (2nC − 3)(nC − 3)
stages, where the two immediate successors of the sender learns m immediately and
then each of the remaining nC − 3 players, who do not know m yet, learns the message
progressively over time.
We conclude this section with some observations about our analysis. First, we allow for
rich communication possibilities, most notably, that players are able to broadcast mes-
sages to any subset of neighbors. This is necessary for our results to hold. For instance,
if players can only send private messages (unicast communication), then reliable trans-
mission of messages, let alone strong reliability, is impossible, on the network in Figure
2. See Dolev and al. (1993) or Beimel and Franklin (1999). Similarly, if players can only
send public messages (broadcast communication), reliable transmission of messages, let
alone strong reliability, is impossible on the network in Figure 3. See Franklin and
Wright (2000) and Renault and Tomala (2008). While the formal proofs are involved,
the intuition is that the receiver is unable to distinguish between two types of histories:
histories where intermediary 1 is pretending that the message is m′ and intermediary
2 is deviating, and histories where intermediary 2 is pretending that the message is m
and intermediary 1 is deviating. The key is that an intermediary can simulate fictitious
histories, i.e., histories of messages sent and received when the message is any m, and
behave accordingly. As is clear from the example, the protocol we construct makes it
possible for the receiver to distinguish these two types of histories. If intermediary 1
deviates and pretend that the message is m′, the receiver correctly infers that interme-
diary 2 is not deviating.
Second, we use authentication keys. While their use is ubiquitous in online retailing,
it is less so in the daily activities of most organizations. Their only purpose, however,
is to insure that a group of individuals share a common information, which can only be
known by individuals outside the group if it is told to them by one member of the group.
For instance, at a meeting, the common information can be the color of the tie of the
meeting’s chair or the identity of the second speaker.
Third, a detailed knowledge of the communication network is not needed. To execute
our protocol, a player on one of the path from the sender to the receiver only needs to
know his two immediate neighbors on the path and the total number of players on the
two disjoint paths.
Finally, the communication games we construct may have additional equilibrium distri-
butions. By construction, these distributions correspond to communication equilibria of
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the direct communication game. The next section shows that in fact we can obtain all
the communication equilibrium distributions of the direct communication game.
R
2
S
1
FIGURE 3. Broadcasting to all: reliable communication is impossible
3.3. Mediated communication. Consider the following mediated extension of the di-
rect communication game. The sender first sends a message m ∈ M to a mediator. The
mediator then sends a message r ∈ R, possibly randomly, to the receiver, who then
takes an action a ∈ A. A strategy for the sender is a map σ : Ω → ∆(M), while a strat-
egy for the receiver is a map τ : R → ∆(A). The mediator follows a recommendation
rule: ϕ : M → ∆(R). A communication equilibrium is a communication device 〈M,R, ϕ〉
and an equilibrium (σ∗, τ ∗) of the mediated game induced by the communication device.
Thanks to the revelation principle (Forges, 1986 and Myerson, 1986), we can restrict at-
tention to canonical communication equilibria, whereM = Ω, R = A and the sender has
an incentive to be truthful (to report the true state), and the receiver has an incentive
to be obedient (to follow the recommendation). We let CEd be the set of communication
equilibrium distributions over A× Ω of the direct communication game.
For an example, consider the game in Figure 4 due to Farrell (1988), where both states
are equally likely.
(uS, uR) a b c
ω 2, 3 0, 2 −1, 0
ω′ 1, 0 2, 2 0, 3
FIGURE 4. An example (Farrell, 1988)
Farrell proves that the receiver takes action b in all equilibria of the direct communi-
cation game. The sender’s payoff is therefore 0 (resp., 2) when the state is ω (resp., ω′),
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while the receiver’s payoff is 2. As argued by Myerson (1991), there exists a communica-
tion equilibrium, where both the receiver and the sender are better off. To see this, as-
sume that the mediator recommends action b to the receiver at state ω′ and randomizes
uniformly between the recommendations a and b at ω. Upon observing the recommen-
dation a, (resp., b), the receiver infers that the state is ω with probability 1 (resp., 1/3)
and, therefore, has an incentive to be obedient. Similarly, the sender has an incentive
to truthfully report his private information. The sender’s payoff is therefore 1 (resp., 2)
when the state is ω (resp., ω′), while the receiver’s payoff is 9/4. Both the sender and
receiver are better off. We now argue that if the communication between the sender and
the receiver is intermediated, then it is possible to replicate this equilibrium outcome,
without the need for a trusted mediator, and regardless of the preferences and behaviors
of the intermediaries (provided that at most one intermediary deviates at each stage of
the communication protocol).
As in Definition 1, we say that robust implementation of mediated communication is
possible on the network N if we can implement all distributions µ ∈ CEd of all direct
communication games, regardless of the preferences and behaviors of the intermediaries
(provided that at most one intermediary deviates at each stage of the communication
protocol). Let N ∗ be the network obtained from N by deleting the edge, if any, between
the sender and the receiver. See Figure 5 for an illustration.
R
2
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1
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2
S
1
FIGURE 5. N (left) and N ∗ (right)
Theorem 3. Robust implementation of mediated communication is possible on the net-
work N if, and only if, N ∗ admits two disjoints paths between the sender and the receiver.
Theorem 3 thus states that if there are two disjoint paths between the sender and the
receiver in the network, where the direct link, if any, between them is removed, then
robust implementation of mediated communication is possible. In other words, we can
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replicate the mediator through unmediated communication, and the replication is ro-
bust.
The need to remove the direct link between the sender and the receiver is clear: if the
only link, whether direct or indirect, between the sender and the receiver is the direct
link, as in the direct communication game, there is no hope to replicate the mediator.
To get a flavor of our construction, let us again consider the network in Figure 2. Assume
that Ω and A are finite sets. Fix a canonical communication equilibrium ϕ : Ω → ∆(A).
For all ω ∈ Ω, let Aω be a partition of [0, 1] into |A| subsets, with the subset Aω(a) corre-
sponding to a having Lebesgue measure ϕ(a|ω). The protocol has three distinct phases.
In the first phase, the sender broadcasts the state ω to the intermediaries 1 and 2. The
second phase replicates the communication device. To do so, the sender and interme-
diary 1 simultaneously choose a randomly generated number in [0, 1]. Let x and y be
the numbers generated by the sender and intermediary 1, respectively. Players then
follow the communication protocol constructed above (see Theorem 2), which makes it
possible for intermediary 1 to reliably transmit y to intermediary 2.9 Thus, at the end
of the second phase, the sender and both intermediaries know ω, x and y, while the
receiver only knows y. The third phase starts once the sender and both intermediaries
have learnt x and y. At the first stage of the third phase, the sender and the interme-
diaries simultaneously compute x+ y (mod [0, 1]), output the recommendation a if x+ y
(mod [0, 1]) ∈ Aω(a), and each starts a communication protocol to reliably transmit the
recommendation to the receiver. Thus, the three communication protocols are synchro-
nized and start at the very same stage. At the end of the third phase, the receiver learns
the recommendation sent by the sender and both intermediaries. Since at most one of
them can deviate at the stage where they broadcast their recommendation, the receiver
decodes at least two identical recommendations and plays it.
4. A CONCLUDING REMARK
Our analysis extends to communication games with multiple senders. More precisely,
consider a direct communication game, where senders receive private signals about a
payoff-relevant state, send messages to the receiver, and the receiver takes an action. If
there exist two disjoint paths of communication from each sender to the receiver, we can
then replicate our analysis to robustly implement any equilibrium distribution of the
9Therefore, intermediary 1 plays the role of the sender, while intermediary 2 plays the role of the receiver.
ROBUST COMMUNICATION ON NETWORKS 19
direct communication game. The key is to have all senders broadcast their messages at
the first stage and then to run copies of our protocol in parallel. Since our protocol is
resilient to what a player learns during its execution, this guarantees that the receiver
learns the correct messages. We stress, however, that it is essential that all senders
move simultaneously at the first stage.
APPENDIX
We first prove Theorem 2 and then prove Theorems 1 and 3. We do not prove the neces-
sity parts as the proof follows well-trodden paths, see e.g., Renault and Tomala (2008)
or Renault et al. (2014).
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Clearly, there is nothing to prove if the sender and receiver are directly connected. So,
assume that the network N admits two disjoint paths between the sender and the re-
ceiver, and denote the two shortest paths by S, i1, . . . , iK , R and S, j1, . . . , jK ′, R respec-
tively, for some K,K ′ ≥ 1. We let P be the set of nodes on these two paths, including
the sender and the receiver, and let nC be its cardinality. Throughout, we refer to these
two paths as the “circle,” with the nodes {S, i1, · · · , iK , R} (resp.,{S, j1, . . . , jK ′, R}) as the
“left side of the circle” (resp., “right side of the circle”). For each player p ∈ P \ {S,R},
we call the successor of p, denoted p+, his immediate successor on the path to the re-
ceiver. Similarly, we call the predecessor of p, denoted p− his immediate predecessor on
the path to the sender. E.g., if p = ik for some 1 ≤ k ≤ K, p+ = ik+1 and p− = ik−1, with
the convention that i0 = S and iK+1 = R. The sender (resp., the receiver) have the same
two nodes as predecessors and successors, i.e., i1 and j1 (reps., iK and jK ′). However, as
will be clear later, whenever i1 (resp., iK) plays the role of a predecessor, then j1 (resp.,
jK ′) plays the role of the successor and, conversely. Thus, we mostly focus on messages
flowing from the sender to the receiver. However, messages will also need to flow in the
other direction.
A.1. The communication protocol (M, σ). Throughout, we write [1 : T ] for {1, . . . , T}.
The message space. Remember thatM is the set of messages in the direct communica-
tion game and let m0 /∈ M be an arbitrary message, interpreted as a null message. The
20 MARIE LACLAU, LUDOVIC RENOU, AND XAVIER VENEL
set of messages player i ∈ I∗ can broadcast to the subset Ni ∈ 2Ni \ {∅} is:
Mi,Ni =
(
M ∪ {m0}
)
× [0, 1]
×
(
×
j∈Ni
{
{∅}
⋃(
{j} × [1 : T ]× [0, 1]
)})
×
(
×
j∈I∗\Ni
{
{∅}
⋃(
{j} × [1 : T ]× [0, 1]
)}L)
,
with L = 1 + (nC − 3)(2nC − 3).
The set of messages player i can send is×Ni∈2Ni\{∅}Mi,Ni. In words, each player can
broadcast to any subset of his neighbors a grand message composed of: (i) a message
m ∈ M or the null message m0, (ii) a number in [0, 1] and (iii) a tuple of triplets, each of
them being composed of the name of a player, a stage, and a number in [0, 1]. Crucially,
player i can send a single triplet about each of his neighbors at each stage. However,
player i can send several triplets (at most L) about the other players. In other words,
at each stage, player i can send a list of triplets to his neighbors Ni, but no list includes
more than one triplet about j ∈ Ni.
The strategies of the players. For any player p /∈ P, the protocol requires them to
broadcast randomly drawn messages inMi,Ni at each stage t to each subset of neighbors
Ni ∈ 2Ni \ {∅}, independently of all messages received and sent up to stage t. In words,
they are babbling.
We now define the strategy for player p ∈ P. We focus on the messages they broadcast
to their neighbors on the circle, i.e., to Np ∩ P. To all other subsets of neighbors, they
sent randomly generated messages, independently of the histories of messages sent and
received, i.e., they babble. In what follows, when we say that player p broadcasts a
message, we mean that he broadcasts the message to the subset {p−, p+}. Remember
that for S (resp., R), {p−, p+} = {i1, j1} (resp., {iK , jK ′}).
• Authentication keys: At each stage t ≥ 1 of the communication protocol, p
broadcasts a uniformly drawn message xtp in [0, 1] to his neighbors on the “circle,”
that is, to the two players in Np ∩ P: this message xtp is called the authentication
key of player p at stage t.
• First stage: At stage t = 1, the sender broadcasts the messagem to his neighbors
on the circle, i.e., to i1 and j1, along with his authentication key. All other players
broadcast m0 to their neighbors on the circle (along with their authentication
keys).
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• Subsequent stages: Starting from stage t = 2 onwards, the protocol proceeds in
blocks of 2nC − 3 stages. Denote these blocks by Bb, with b = 1, 2 . . . , B. (We have
at most nC − 3 blocks.) For instance, B1 stands for the block that starts at stage
t = 2, B2 stands for the block that starts at stage t = 2 + 2n
C − 3 = 2nC − 1, etc.
For each b = 1, 2 . . . , let Bb := {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 3} where tb is the first stage of
block Bb. In each block Bb, the strategy of p is the following:
– Transmission of the sender’s message:
∗ if p knows the message m at the beginning of the block, that is, either p
is in {S, i1, j1} or p has learnt the message m at the end of the previous
block (see below, where the decoding rule at the end of each block is
defined), then p broadcasts the message m to his neighbors p− and p+
at all stages tb, . . . , tb + 2n
C − 3 of the current block (the neighbors of S
are i1 and j1);
∗ if p does not know the message m at the beginning of the block, then p
broadcasts m0 to his neighbors p
− and p+ at all stages tb, . . . , tb+2n
C − 3
of the current block.
(Remember that p also sends an authentication key.)
– Detection of deviations:
∗ if p detects his successor p+ making a false announcement about the
message m ∈M at some stage t ∈ {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4}, that is,
· either p knows m ∈ M and p+ broadcasts at stage t the message
m˜ ∈ M \ {m}, interpreted as “player p+ is broadcasting the false
message m˜,”
· or p does not know the message m and p+ broadcasts at stage t
the message m˜ ∈ M , interpreted as “player p+ is broadcasting the
message m˜ although he cannot know it,”
then p broadcasts the triplet (p+, t, xt
p+
) to player p− and to p+, where
xtp+ is the true authentication key broadcasted by p
+ at t. Note that if
p = S (resp., R), then p+ is either i1 or j1 (resp., iK or jK ′).
∗ if p does not detect his successor p+ making a false announcement about
the message m ∈ M at some stage t ∈ {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4}, then p
broadcasts the triplet (p+, t, y) to p− and p+, where y is randomly drawn
from [0, 1].
The key observation to make is that only players p and p++ know the true
authentication key of p+ at stage t. Therefore, p++ can authenticate whether
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p+ deviated at some stage t by cross-checking the authentication key xt
p+
received from p+ at t with the key broadcasted by p (and having transited on
the circle in the opposite direction).
– Transmission of past deviations:
∗ If p 6= i1 is on the left side of the circle and receives at some stage
t ∈ {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4}
· from p+ a message containing the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), tb ≤ s < t with
p′ on the left side of the circle, then p broadcasts the message to p−
and p+ at stage t+ 1.
· from p− a message containing the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), tb ≤ s < t with
p′ on the right side of the circle, then p broadcasts the message to
p− and p+ at stage t + 1.
∗ Similarly, if p 6= j1 is on the right side of the circle and receives at some
stage t ∈ {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4}
· from p+ a message containing the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), tb ≤ s < t with
p′ on the right side of the circle, then p broadcasts the message to
p− and p+ at stage t + 1.
· from p− a message containing the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), tb ≤ s < t with
p′ on the left side of the circle, then p broadcasts the message to p−
and p+ at stage t+ 1.
∗ If p = i1 (respectively p = j1) receives from p+ a message containing
the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), tb ≤ s < t with p
′ on the left side of the circle
(respectively with p′ on the right side of the circle), then p broadcasts
the message to p− and p+ at stage t+ 1.
∗ If p = i1 (respectively p = j1) receives from p− = S at some stage t ∈
{tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4} a message containing the triplet (p′, s, xsp′), with
tb ≤ s < t and p′ on the right side of the circle (resp., on the left side of
the circle), then two cases are possible:
(i): If p′ 6= j1 (resp., p′ 6= i1), then p broadcasts it to both p− = S and
p+ = i2 (resp., p
+ = j2) at stage t+ 1.
(ii): If p′ = j1 (resp., p
′ = i1) and p = i1 (resp., p = j1) has not received
the triplet (p, s, xsp), then p = i1 (resp., p = j1) broadcasts the triplet
(j1, s, x
s
j1
) (resp., (i1, s, x
s
i1
)) at stage t+ 1.
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(iii): If p′ = j1 (resp., p
′ = i1) and p = i1 (resp., p = j1) has received the
triplet (p, s, xsp), then p = i1 (resp., p = j1) broadcasts the triplet
(p′, s, y) at state t + 1, with y a random draw from [0, 1].
The intuition is that if p receives from S a message, which reads as “S
claims that both i1 and j1 deviated at the same stage s,” then S must be
deviating (since under unilateral deviations, at most one player devi-
ates at each stage).
∗ Auto-correcting past own deviations: if p has received the triplet
(p′, s, xsp′) at stage t ∈ {tb, . . . , tb+2n
C − 4} but didn’t forward it at stages
t+1, . . . , t+∆, then he forwards it at stage t+∆+1. In words, the protocol
requires a player to broadcast the triplet (p′, s, xsp′) at stage t + 1 upon
receiving it at stage t, to broadcast it at t+2 if he fails to broadcast it at
stage t+1, to broadcast it at t+3 f he fails to broadcast it at stage t+1
and t + 2, etc, so that unless the player deviates at all stages t′ ≥ t + 1,
the triplet is broadcasted at some stage during the block.
The decoding rule. The decoding rule describes how messages are analyzed at the end
of each block. Players not in P do not analyze their messages. Consider now the players
in P.
At the beginning of block B1, the sender and his two neighbors i1 and j1 know the mes-
sage m broadcasted by the sender at stage t = 1. At the end of each block, only players
who do not know yet m analyze the message received during the block. Thus, only the
players in P \ {S, i1, j1} analyze messages as the end of the block B1. (The gist of our
arguments is to show that the set of players who know m at the end of a block is strictly
expanding over time and, ultimately, includes the receiver.) Thus, consider player p,
who does not know yet m at the beginning of the block Bb. At the end of the block Bb, he
analyzes messages as follows:
• If p has received during the block (nC − 1) times a grand message containing
the same message m ∈ M from his predecessor p−, let say at stages s1, . . . , sn
C−1,
where tb ≤ s1 < s2 < · · · < sn
C−1 ≤ tb + 2nC − 3,
• and if p has not received by stage sn
C−1 at the latest from his successor p+ the
message (p−, s1, xs
1
p−
) where xs
1
p−
matches the value of the authentication key re-
ceived by p from p− at stage s1,
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then, player p learns the messagem and starts the next block Bb+1 as a player who knows
m. Otherwise, player p does not learn the message. Moreover, once a player knows the
message m, he knows it at all the subsequent blocks. If p = R and p− = iK (resp, jK ′),
then p+ = jK ′ (resp., p
− = iK).
At all other histories, the strategies are left unspecified.
A.2. Two key properties of the protocol. The protocol we construct has two key
properties. The first property states that no player p ∈ P learns incorrectly, that is,
if player p ∈ P learns a message, the message is indeed the one the sender has sent.
Lemma 1 is a formal statement of that property.
Lemma 1. Let m ∈ M be the message broadcasted by the sender to i1 and j1 at stage
t = 1. If at most one player deviates from the protocol at each stage, then it is not possible
for player p ∈ P to learn m′ ∈M \ {m}.
Proof of Lemma 1. By contradiction, assume that player p ∈ P learns m′ ∈ M \ {m} at
the end of some block Bb, b ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, assume that p is the first
player to learn m′ on the path from S to R where p lies.
For player p to learn m′, during the block Bb, it must be that player p has received a
sequence of nC − 1 grand messages from his predecessor p−, say at stages s1, . . . , sn
C−1
with tb ≤ s1 < s2 < · · · < sn
C−1 ≤ tb + 2nC − 1, such that (i) the first element of each
of the nC − 1 grand messages is m′ and (ii) player p did not receive from p+ the triplet
(p−, s1, xs
1
p−) on or before stage s
nC−1, where xs
1
p− matches the value of the authentication
key received from p− at stage s1.
Since we assume thatm′ 6= m, it must be that that p− is deviating at all stages s1, . . . , sn
C−1,
as we assume that p is the first player to learn m′. Therefore, since we consider at most
one deviation at each stage, all players in P \ {p−} are playing according to σ at all
stages s1, . . . , sn
C−1. It follows that player p−−, the predecessor of p−, broadcasts the
triplet (p−, s1, xs
1
p−
) to p− and p−−− at stage s2 at the latest, that player p−−− broadcasts it
at stage s3 at the latest, etc.10
Since there are nC − 2 nodes other than p− and p on the circle, player p+ broadcasts the
triplet (p−, s1, xs
1
p−
) to players p and p++ at stage sn
C−1 at the latest. Thus, player p does
not validate m′ with that sequence of grand messages.
10Notice that it is possible for p−− to broadcast the message (p−, s1, xs
1
p−
) before stage s2. For instance it
is possible to have a stage s1
′
, with s1 < s1
′
< s2, such that (i) p− is not deviating at stage s1
′
and sends
eitherm orm0 depending on if he knowsm or not, and (ii) p
−− is deviating at stage s1
′
by not transmitting
(p−, s1, xs
1
p−
) to p− and p−−.
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Since this is true for any such sequences, player p does not learn m′ at block Bb. 
Lemma 1 states that no player on the circle learns an incorrect message. The next
Lemma states that at least one new player learns the correct message at the end of each
block, which guarantees that the receiver learns the correct message at the latest after
1 + (nC − 3)(2nC − 3) stages.
Lemma 2. Let m ∈ M be the message broadcasted by the sender to i1 and j1 at stage
t = 1. Suppose that all intermediaries i1 to ik and j1 to jk′ know the message m at the
beginning of the block Bb. If at most one player deviates from the protocol at each stage,
then either intermediary ik+1 or intermediary jk′+1 is learning m at the end of the block
Bb with probability one.
To be more precise, Lemma 2 states that for all σ′ ∈ Σ∗(σ), the subset of histories at
which either intermediary ik+1 or intermediary jk′+1 is learningm at the end of the block
Bb has probability one according to Pσ′ .
Proof of Lemma 2. Given a finite set M , we denote by |M | its cardinality. To ease nota-
tion, let i := ik and j := ik′. We want to prove that either i
+ or j+ learns the message at
the end of the block Bb = {tb, . . . , tb + 2nC − 4}. The proof is by contradiction. So, assume
neither i+ nor j+ learns the message at the end of the block.
Fix a strategy profile σ′ ∈ Σ∗(σ). Denote by Si the stages where player i is deviating
from σ, by Si
−
the stages where player i− is deviating, by Sj the stages where player j
is deviating and by Sj
−
the stages where player j− is deviating. From the definition of
Σ∗(σ), the sets Si, Si
−
, Sj and Sj
−
are pairwise disjoints. In particular,
|Si|+ |Si
−
|+ |Sj|+ |Sj
−
| ≤ |Si ∪ Si
−
∪ Sj ∪ Sj
−
| ≤ 2nC − 3. (1)
Throughout, for any subset S of Bb, we write S for its complement in Bb. By definition, at
all stages in Si, player i follows σi and deviates at all others. Let Si := {s1, . . . , sℓ, . . . , sℓ∗i },
with sℓ < sℓ+1 for all ℓ. Notice that ℓ
∗
i = (2n
C − 3)− |Si|.
Assume that ℓ∗i ≥ n
C − 1. Since player i follows the protocol at all stages in Si, player
i+ observes at least one sequence of messages such that m is broadcasted nC − 1 times
by player i. Consider all sequences (sℓ1, . . . , sℓnC−1) of distinct elements of S
i such that
all sequences have nC − 1 consecutive elements, that is, if sℓ and sℓ′ are elements of the
sequence, so are all sℓ′′ satisfying sℓ < sℓ′′ < sℓ′ . By construction, there are (ℓ
∗
i +1)− (n
C−
1) = nC − |Si| − 1 such sequences. All these sequences have different starting stages
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and, therefore, different ending stages. Recall that player i broadcasts m at all stages of
these sequences.
Fix the sequence (sℓ1 , . . . , sℓnC−1). The protocol specifies that player i
+ learns m if and
only if he has not received the correct authentication key x
sℓ1
i from player i
++ by the
stage sℓ
nC−1
. Therefore, player i+ does not learnm only if player i− broadcasts the correct
authentication key at some stage s > sℓ1 ; the other players do not know the authentica-
tion key and the probability of guessing it correctly is zero. Moreover, since the protocol
requires player i− to broadcast x
sℓ1
i only if player i broadcasts m
′ 6= m at stage sℓ1, which
he does not, player i− must be deviating. Therefore, s ∈ Si
−
.
Remember that player i− can broadcast at most one authentication key about player i
at each stage. Therefore, since there are nC − |Si| − 1 such sequences, player i− must
deviate at least nC − |Si| − 1 times for player i+ to not learn m, that is,
|Si
−
| ≥ nC − |Si| − 1. (2)
It follows that
|Si|+ |Si
−
| ≥ nC − 1. (3)
Assume now that ℓ∗i < n
C−1. We have that |Si| = (2nC−3)−ℓ∗i > 2n
C−3−nC−1 = nC−2,
hence |Si| ≥ nC − 1. Inequality (3) is also satisfied.
A symmetric argument applies to the pair of player j and player j−, hence
|Sj|+ |Sj
−
| ≥ nC − 1, (4)
since player j+ does not learn m either. Summing Equations (3) (4), we obtain that
|Si|+ |Si
−
|+ |Sj|+ |Sj
−
| ≥ 2nC − 2, (5)
a contradiction with Equation (1). This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
To conclude the proof, it is enough to invoke Lemma 1 and 2, which guarantees that the
receiver learns almost surely the message broadcasted by the sender.
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APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let (σ∗, τ ∗) be an equilibrium of the direct communication game with equilibrium dis-
tribution µ. We use the protocol (M, σ) used to prove Theorem 2 to prove Theorem 1.
The communication game is Γ(M,N ). We now describe the strategies. If the state is
ω, the sender chooses a message m in the support of σ∗(·|ω) ∈ ∆(M) and then follows
the protocol σS, that is, the sender first broadcasts m to the intermediaries (i1, j1), i.e.,
his two immediate successors on the two disjoint paths to the receiver, and then follows
σS at all stages t ≥ 2. Note that σS is independent of ω at all stages t ≥ 2. Similarly,
intermediary i ∈ I follows the strategy σi. Lastly, the receiver follows σR until he learns
the message m, at which stage he takes an action in A according to τ ∗(·|m) ∈ ∆(A).
Clearly, since the receiver learns the message m at all histories consistent with unilat-
eral deviations, no intermediary has an incentive to deviate since it would result in the
same expected payoff. Similarly, the sender has no incentives to deviate since the sender
selects the messagem according to the equilibrium strategy of the direct communication
game and, conditional on broadcasting m at the first stage, the receiver receives m at
all histories consistent with unilateral deviations, including deviations by the sender.
Finally, the receiver has no incentive to deviate either. If he stops the game earlier, then
his expected payoff is weakly lower as a consequence of Blackwell’s theorem. Indeed,
the only informative message about ω is m and stopping earlier is a garbling of m.
APPENDIX C. SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY
As already argued in the text, sequential rationality is guaranteed at all histories con-
sistent with at most one intermediary deviating at each stage of the communication
game. We therefore focus our attention on all other histories, i.e., histories not in H(σ).
We first consider all intermediaries (i1, . . . , iK) and (j1, . . . , jK ′). We treat the sender and
receiver separately.
Rebooting strategies. We say that player i reboots his strategy at period t if, from any
history hti /∈ Hi(σ) onwards, he follows the protocol as if he knows that the message is
m0. That is, at history h
t
i, he broadcasts the message m0, an authentication key x
t
i, and
random triplets (j, tj , x
tj
j ), j ∈ Ni. At all subsequent histories consistent with at most
one intermediary deviating from the protocol at each stage, player i continues to follow
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the protocol. That is, player i continues to broadcast m0, authentication keys and triplet
(j, tj , x
tj
j ), as specified by the protocol when a player knows a message (here, it is m0).
At all other histories, player i reboots yet again his strategy, that is, player i continues
to broadcast m0, authentication keys and triplets, as if the multilateral deviation hadn’t
taken place.
Beliefs. At history hti /∈ Hi(σ), player i believes that all other players on the same side
of the circle reboot their strategies, while players on the other side of the circle continue
to follow the protocol. (Here, the sender and receiver are assumed to be on the other
side of the circle.) In other words, player i believes that all other players on the same
side of the circle have also observed a multilateral deviation, while players on the other
side have observed no deviations.
We now consider the sender. At all histories htS, the sender continues to follow the pro-
tocol as if the observed multilateral deviations hadn’t happened. However, he believes
that all intermediaries reboot their strategies at period t, while the receiver continues
to follow the protocol.
Finally, we consider the receiver. The receiver continues to validate messages as he
does in the protocol, i.e., he tests sequences of messages of length nC − 1 received by
his two predecessors and validates a message if he has received a sequence of nC − 1
identical copies of the message and has not received the correct authentication on time
(see the construction of the protocol for details). To complete the construction of the
strategies, we assume that if the receiver validates m ∈ M and m0 /∈ M , then he plays
τ ∗(m). Similarly, if he validates two different messages (m,m′) ∈ M×M or (m0, m0) or no
messages at all, he plays a best reply to his prior. At all histories, the receiver continues
to follow the protocol as if the observed deviations hadn’t happened. He believes that all
intermediaries reboot their strategies, while the sender continues to follow the protocol.
Sequential rationality. At history hti /∈ Hi(σ), an intermediary expects the receiver to
validate a message m ∈ M from the other side and to validate the message m0 from his
side. Since the receiver takes the decision τ ∗(m) when validating the messages m ∈ M
and m0 /∈ M , the intermediary cannot deviate profitably (as, regardless of his play, the
receiver validates m from the other side). Therefore, rebooting the strategy is optimal.
Similarly, since the sender expects the intermediaries iK and jK ′ to reboot their strate-
gies, he expects the receiver to play a∗ and, therefore, cannot profitably deviate. The
same applies to the receiver.
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APPENDIX D. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof is constructive and relies extensively on Theorem 2. The main idea is to gen-
erate a jointly controlled lottery between the sender and one of the two intermediaries i1
or j1 to generate a recommendation, which is then reliably transmitted to the receiver.
We start with a formal definition of jointly controlled lotteries.
Definition 3. Let µ ∈ ∆(A). A jointly controlled lottery generating µ is a triple (X, Y, φ)
such that
- X is a measurable function from a probability space (U,U ,P) to ([0, 1],B[0,1]),
- Y is a measurable function from a probability space (U,U ,P) to ([0, 1],B[0,1]),
- X and Y are independent,
- and φ is a measurable function from ([0, 1]2,B[0,1]2) to (A,BA),
such that
(i) the law of Z := φ(X, Y ) is µ,
(ii) for every x ∈ [0, 1], the law of φ(x, Y ) is µ,
(iii) and for every y ∈ [0, 1], the law of φ(X, y) is µ.
As explained in the main text, when A is finite, any distribution µ over A can be gen-
erated by a jointly controlled lottery. The idea is to partition the interval [0, 1] into
|A| sub-intervals, where the length of the sub-interval associated with a is µ(a). Let
f : [0, 1] → A, where f(r) = a if r is in the sub-interval associated with a. Note that
f−1(a) is a Borel set and has measure µ(a). Consider then two uniform random vari-
ables X and Y . The key observation to make is that the sums X + Y mod [0, 1], x + Y
mod [0, 1], and X + y mod [0, 1] are also uniformly distributed on [0, 1], regardless of the
values of x and y. Therefore, if we let φ(x, y) = a if x + y mod [0, 1] ∈ f−1(a), then the
triplet (X, Y, φ) generates µ. The next proposition states that this construction general-
izes to arbitrary complete and separable metric space A.
Proposition 1. For any µ ∈ ∆(A), there exists a jointly controlled lottery (X, Y, φ) that
generates µ.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let λ be the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. From the fundamental
principle of simulation (Theorem A.3.1, p. 38 in Bouleau and Lepingle, 1993), there
exists a Borel function f : [0, 1]→ A such that f is λ-a.e. continuous and
∀E ∈ BA, λ ◦ f
−1(E) := λ(f−1(E)) = µ(E).
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To complete the proof, let X and Y be two random variables with uniform distribution
on [0, 1] and define φ as
φ(x, y) = f(x+ y mod [0,1]),
for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]. It is routine to verify that the triplet (X, Y, φ) is a jointly controlled
lottery, which generates µ. 
We now explain how to robustly implement mediated communication on the network
N . Let τ ∗ : Ω → ∆(A) be a canonical communication equilibrium of the direct commu-
nication game. From Proposition 1, for each ω, there exists a jointly controlled lottery
(Xω, Yω, φω), which generates τ
∗(ω).
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we let P be the players on the two disjoint path from the
sender to the receiver. The communication game is as follows:
t = 1: The sender truthfully broadcasts the state ω to the intermediaries i1 and j1.
t = 2: The sender and intermediary i1 draw a random number in [0,1] each. Let x (resp.,
y) the number drawn by the sender (resp., intermediary i1). The sender and the
intermediary i1 broadcast their random number.
t = 3, . . . , 2 + (2nC − 3)(nC − 3): The players p ∈ P execute the protocol with i1 in the role
of the sender and j1 in the role of the receiver and the message to be transmitted
is y.
t = 3 + (2nC − 3)(nC − 3): The sender and the intermediaries i1 and j1 outputs a recom-
mendation a ∈ A according to (Xω, Yω, φω), that is, the recommendation is φω(x, y)
with ω the state broadcasted at t = 1. The three of them truthfully broadcast the
recommendation.
t = 4 + (2nC − 3)(nC − 3), . . . , 2 + 2(2nC − 3)(nC − 3): The players execute in parallel and
independently three copies of the protocol with S, i1 and j1 in the role of the
sender, respectively, and the message to be transmitted is the recommendation
a. At the last stage, the receiver follows the recommendation made a majority of
times, if any. (If there is no majority, then he chooses an arbitrary action.)
Since at stage t = 3 + (2nC − 3)(nC − 3), at most one of the three “senders” can deviate,
the correct recommendation is sent at least twice. It follows that if the receiver is obe-
dient, the receiver chooses the correct action at all histories consistent with unilateral
deviations. Moreover, since the receiver observes neither ω nor x, he has no additional
information about the state than in the direct communication game, hence he has an
incentive to be obedient.
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